RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ECOLOGY HELD
VALID CRITERION FOR DENYING DREDGE
AND FILL PERMIT UNDER SECTION 10,
RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899
In Zabel v. Tabb1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the Secretary of the Army may refuse to grant a dredge and

fill permit under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
solely on "conservation

grounds,"

18992

even after a specific

determination that the project would not interfere with navigation.3
Landowners Zabel and Russell proposed dredge and fill operations

on eleven and one-half acres of their land underlying Florida's Boca
Ciega Bay for the"purpose of constructing a trailer park. After
experiencing vigorous opposition, they obtained the necessary
consent from the applicable state and local authorities 4 and applied
for a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. 5 At a public

hearing, several Florida agencies, including the Florida Board of
Conservation, renewed their opposition to the landowners' plan, and

both the District Engineer and the Division Engineer recommended
against issuing the permit. Accepting these recommendations, the

Secretary of the Army denied the application due to the potentially
harmful effect on fish and wildlife in Boca Ciega Bay, 6 the

opposition of the Florida agencies, and the probable conflict with the
I. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1971).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964). See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
3. 430 F.2d at 213. Some preliminary issues were considered by the court including
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, to protect fish and
wildlife in navigable waters and whether such power was relinquished to the states in the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964), but they were all disposed of in
consonance with the Secretary of the Army's position.
4. See Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay. Control Auth., 154 So. 2d 181, 183-84 (Dist.
Ct. App. Fla. 1963), quashed and remanded, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
5. While final authority to issue permits rests with the Secretary of the Army, the initial
"field" determination is made by the Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1964).
6. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, was opposed
to the dredge and fill project. 43fY F.2d at 202.
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Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958.7 Landowners filed in
the district court seeking reversal of the Secretary's decision,
stipulating "-that there was evidence before the Corps of Army
Engineers sufficient to justify an administrative agency finding that
[the] fill would do damage to the ecology or the marine life on the
bottom."' Also, the Corps of Engineers admitted that "the proposed
work would have no material adverse effect on navigation."' The
district court, in granting landowners' motion for summary
judgment, held that section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act did
not "vest the Secretary of the Army with discretionary authority"
to deny dredge and fill permits for non-navigational reasons, 0
ordered the Secretary to issue a permit, and enjoined the
Government from interfering with the dredging and filling
operations. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and
rendered summary judgment in favor of the Government."
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 prohibits, inter
alia, excavating, dredging, or filling in "any navigable water of the
United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief
of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to
beginning the same."' 2 Nothing in the Act suggests criteria to be
used by the Secretary in granting or withholding his authorization,
although Congress, when it considered the Act, was primarily
concerned with protecting navigation.' 3 The courts, when faced with
possible arbitrariness on the part of the Secretary, have generally
interpreted section 10 to require the issuance of a permit for projects
which do not impede navigation." There are other acts of Congress,
however, which further delineate the Secretary's authority in
conjunction with the Rivers and Harbors Act. The Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act of 195815 provides that any federal agency
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661,662 (1964), as amended 16 U.S.C. § 662(d) (Supp. V, 1910).
8. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764,767 (M.D. Fla. 1969).

9. Id.
10. Id. at 771.
11. 430 F.2d at 215.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
13. 32 CONG. R c. 2297 (1899). This view is reflected in discussions by commentators on

the function of the Corps of Army Engineers. E.g., Army Corps of Engineers, I BNA,
ENVIRONMENT REP.-FEDERAL LAWS 15:1501 (1970).

14. Compare Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929), with Greenleaf-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 268 (1915), and Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v.
Dern, 83 F.2d 715, 719 (D.C. Cir.), affd on rehearing, 86 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 556 (1936).
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661 et seq. (1964).
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-licensing water projects which affect the physical characteristics of

"any stream or other body of water" must first consult with the
Department of the Interior, as well as with the agency having

jurisdiction over the wildlife resources within the particular state
where the project is to be constructed."6 That Act, and particularly

the word "consult," could be interpreted as requiring the Secretary
of the Army to examine all possible plans and choose the alternative

least damaging to the environment prior to granting permits for
projects which do not obstruct navigation. On the other hand, the
Act could be interpreted as having expanded the grounds for denial
of permits for dredge and fill operations, allowing the Secretary to
reject all plans if all would cause unacceptable damage to the

environment-regardless of whether the project affected navigation.
The latter interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the

Fish and Wilflife Coordination Act. Congress expressed concern
over environmental damage caused by dredging and filling in "bays
and estuaries along the coastlines." 17 The former interpretation,

however, is more closely aligned with the case law construing section
10 of the Rivers and, Harbors Act to require issuance of a permit

where a project would not obstruct navigation.

Although the Fish'

and Wildlife Coordination Act does not expressly establish that

Congress intended for conservation to become a permissible criterion
for prohibiting navigationally-acceptable projects, the Corps of
Engineers has claimed discretionary authority to deny section 10

permits for environmental reasons. 19 The National Environmental

16. Id. § 662(a).
17. S. REp. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958) reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEws 3446, 3450. "More seriously, existing law has no application whatsoever to the
dredging and filling of bays and estuaries by private interests ...under permit from the
Corps of Engineers ....
The amendments proposed by this bill would remedy these deficiencies. ..."Id.
18. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. This interpretation of the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act also finds support in certain language in the Senate Report on the
Act-language tending to disclaim any intention to radically alter the existing policies
conoerning authorizations for water projects.
The legislation would be a permissive law so far as it concerns relationship between
water project construction agencies and fish and wildlife conservation agencies. The
latter would not be given any veto power over any part of the water resource
development program. S. REP. No. 1981, supra note 17, at 6.
The Zabel v. Tabb district court noted that this left the veto power in an agency not having
expertise in ecology matters, an absurdity it refused to recognize. 296 F. Supp. at 769.
19. See Army Corps of Engiieers, Administrative Regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)
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Policy Act of 1969,20 enacted after the district court decision in
Zabel v. Tabb, also may affect the power of the Secretary of the
Army to issue dredge and fill permits. While this Act stressed
Congress's concern for the environment and directed broad
cooperation among the federal agencies, it did not explicitly resolve
the uncertainty concerning the Secretary's discretion under section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The Policy Act directed
that "the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the

[environmental] policies set forth in [this Act]."'2 It is silent,
however, on the question of whether Congress intended that the
Secretary's discretion include the authority to "interpret and
administer" by denying a dredge and fill permit for ecological
reasons alone.2 The conference report on the Act seems to support
a generous interpretation of the Army Secretary's power, including
the power to refuse dredge and fill permits, for it expresses the
conferees' intent that "no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow
construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid

compliance."3
While the trend in the federal courts has been toward liberal
statutory construction to include or stress environmental
considerations,24 cases arising under section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 have not firmly established the scope of the
(1970); Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of the Army, July 13, 1967, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1l) (1970). Cf. Dept of Army,
Chief of Engineers News Release, Army Engineers Issue Environmental Guidelines for Civil
Works Programs (Dec. 10, 1970); 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 827
(1970) (where Army Secretary Resor upheld denial of dredging permit because of "little
justification' for development that would result in 'irretrievable damage to the environment
and to fish and wildlife.' ")
20. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. March 1970).
21. Id. § 4332(1) (emphasis added).
22. See text after note 16 supra. Sections 4333 and 4334 of the Policy Act could be
interpreted as precluding any expansion in the scope of existing agency authorizations without
further legislation since section 4333 requires all federal agencies to review their statutory
authorizations for provisions which might contradict or prevent full compliance with the
Policy.Act, and section 4334 disclaims any intent for the Act to affect existing agency
obligations to coordinate or consult with one another.
23. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969) reprinted in 1969 U.S. CoDE
CONG. &AD. NEws 2767,2770.
24. See Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REv. 458, 46773 (1970). But see New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
962 (1969).
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-Secretary's authority.2 In Wisconsin v. Illinois2 ' the Supreme Court

interpreted section 10 to prohibit "unreasonable obstructions to
navigation and navigable capacity," z but noted that the Secretary's
limited authority did not include the power to issue a permit merely
to aid a sewage disposal project.2 ' This emphasis on navigation as
the primary concern of the Corps of Engineers in administering the
Rivers and Harbors Act" was modified by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 30 which called for broader
interpretations of statutory language to take into account the
problems of pollution. 3 1 However, this case arose under section 13
of the Act, 3 2 a section more easily related to ecology since it
regulates the depositing of "refuse matter" in navigable waters. The
two principal cases arising under section 10 where navigation was
not at issue are uninstructive. In United States ex rel. Greathouse
v. Dern3 the Supreme Court refused to issue a mandamus ordering
the Secretary to authorize construction of a wharf in the Potomac
River despite the fact that the Secretary's refusal was premised upon
the fact that the wharf would have increased the Government's
expense in building a proposed parkway. The Court found it
unnecessary to consider the extent of the Secretary's section 10
discretion, basing its decision on the equitable principles governing
the issuance of writs of mandamus. Recently, in Citizens Committee
for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,35 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed an injunction by a district court which ordered the
Corps of Engineers not to issue a dredge and fill permit to the State
of New York for the construction of the Hudson River Expressway.
The decision was premised upon the state's failure to obtain requisite
25. Typically, courts accepted the proposition that section 10 was "concerned with

obstructions to navigation." E.g., Chambers-Liberty Counties Nay. Dist. v. Parker Bros. &
Co., 263 F. Supp. 602, 607 (S.D. Texas 1967). See United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United
States, 295 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1961).
26. 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
27. Id. at 413.
28. Id. at 418.
29. See note 25 supra.
30. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
31. Id. at 226.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
33. 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
34. Id.at 360.
35. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,39 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1970).
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congressional and Department of Transportation approval for the
construction of certain structures" and was decided primarily under
section 9 of -the Rivers and Harbors Act,n7 rather than section 10.
The Second Circuit gave no indication of the authority of the
Secretary of the Army to deny the permit after congressional and
Department of Transportation approval of the expressway was
obtained.
. The court of appeals in Zabel v. Tabb acknowledged
the
uncertainty generated by section 10 and the failure of the case law
adequately to define its limits. 38The court interpreted the section as
a "flat prohibition" against the "building of structures and the
excavating and filling in navigable waters" 3' and pointed out that the
ban is lifted only upon the Secretary of the Army's authorization.
Section 10 was not seen to place any restrictions on either the denial
of a permit or the Secretary's reasons for refusing to issue one.
Citing the legislative history of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act of 1958," the "Memoiandum of Understanding" between the
Secretaries of the Army and of the Interior," and the Greathouse
and Citizens Committee decisions,42 the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the Secretary of the Army "is acting under a Congressional mandate
to collaborate and consider . . . [environmental] factors."'

The

court felt that the combined effect of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of
19584 left no doubt that the Secretary could refuse solely on
conservation grounds to issue a permit for a project posing no
obstruction to navigation. Although the Policy Act postdated both
the denial of the permit by the Secretary and the district court
36. Id. at 106.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964). While section 10 is concerned with obstructions to navigation
and the construction of wharves, piers, and other projects in navigable waters, section 9
regulates the building of "bridges, causeways, dams or dikes" over or adjacent to the
navigable waters of the United States.
38. The district court opinion in Zabel v. Tabb noted that "[t]he parties suggest and
research of the court indicates that this is a case of first impression." 296 F. Supp. at 765.
39. 430 F.2d at 207.
40. See note 17 supra.
41. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(11) (1970).
42. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
43. 430 F.2d at 213.
44. The court also mentioned a report issued by the House Committee on Government
Operations from a study conducted by its Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee,
which, while lacking the status of legislative history, seemed to support its rationale. Id. at
214 n.7, citing H.R. REp. No. 91-917, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
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decision, 5 the Fifth Circuit determined that the Secretary's action
must be evaluated by the standards currently applicable.
On its facts, Zabel v. Tabb was a perfect vehicle for determining
the scope of the Army Secretary's authority, since the crucial
matters of ecological harm and absence of navigational obstruction
were stipulated by the parties. While adopting a broad interpretation
of the Secretary's power and accepting conservation as a permissible
criterion for denying permits, the Fifth Circuit left its precise
rationale unclear. The judicial precedents relied upon by the court
were poor, and its treatment of the applicable statutes was
ambiguous. The Greathouse case, which the Fifth Circuit asserted
"recognized that the Corps of Engineers does not have to wear
navigational blinders when it considers a permit request,"'" cannot
fairly be taken as authority for anything but the power of the
Supreme Court to apply equitable standards to deny mandamus.
The scope of authority vested in the Secretary of the Army under
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 was never
discussed; indeed, this issue was but one of several uncertainties
regarding the right of the applicants to the judicial writ. The decision
in Citizens Committee is no more conclusive, for there the Second'
Circuit was involved in construing together sections 9 and 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act and admonishing the Corps of Engineers
to refrain from issuing a dredge and fill permit without having
considered what authorizations the other phases of an applicant's
project would require. Far from declaring, as the Fifth Circuit
claimed, that the Corps "cannot be oblivious to the effect of fill
projects on the beauty and conservation of natural resources, ' 47 the
Second Circuit was only preventing the Corps of Engineers from
effectively undercutting the authority of Congress and the
Department of Transportation to approve, under section 9, the
construction of certain structures over navigable waters. Apparently
compensating for the weakness of these two judicial precedents, the
Fifth Circuit in Zabel v. Tabb asserted that the federal government's
policy of environmental conservation, as revealed in the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 and the National Environmental
45. The permit was denied by the Secretary of the Army on February 28, 1967, and the
district court rendered its decision on February 17, 1969. The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, however, did not become effective until January 1, 1970.
46. 430 F.2d at 208.
47. Id. n.15.
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Policy Act of 1969, made reliance on case law unnecessary. The
problem with this rationale is that the court failed to recognize the
two possible interpretations of these Acts: that the Secretary, while
required to authorize a navigationally-acceptable project, must
consider ecology in choosing which plan will be permitted, or
alternatively that the Secretary, for ecological reasons, may refuse
to issue the permit altogether, regardless of navigational
considerations. Ignoring these alternatives, the court consequently
failed to explain exactly how the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
and the National Environment Policy Act established the latter
result in the face of judicial precedent favoring the former." In
addition the court failed to make clear whether the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act of 1958, standing alone, would have sufficed as
the basis for its decision. This question becomes important because
two federal district courts have recently ruled the National
Environmental Policy Act .of 1969 not retroactive in its effect,18 and
another found the Act inapplicable in determining whether the
Secretary of the Army may deny a dredge and fill permit for nonnavigational reasons. 51 If either interpretation gains acceptance by
the other federal courts of appeal, a conflict with the position taken
by the Fifth Circuit would evolve, undermining the Zabel decision.
This would be unfortunate, for the Fifth Circuit could have reached
the same salutary result by relying entirely upon the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958, which undoubtedly was intended
to expand the role of the Corps of Engineers in protecting the
environment. The alteration of United States coastlines by dredge
and fill operations is a significant source of destruction of this
country's natural resources, 52 and the decision in Zabel v. Tabb,
48. See text following note 16 supra.

49. See note 14 supraand accompanying text.
50. Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970), where the
Policy Act was held not retroactive where significant work had already been completed on
power transmission facilities; Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F.
Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), where the district court examined the legislative history of the
Act and decided that it should not be applied retroactively to the Secretary of Transportation's
approval of an unconstructed highway which had been planned prior to the passage of the
Act and for which a contract had been awarded.
51, Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Secretary of the Army, 315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
This district court is within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, which declared in Zabel v.
Tabb that the Act was indeed applicable. Still, the fact that the district court disagreed could
mean that the issue is not one-sided and that the other circuits might handle it differently.
52. Heath, Estuarine ConservationLegislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATR L. REv. 351,
352-53 (1970).

Vol. 1970:1239]

ECOLOGY AND DREDGING

1247

when read in conjunction with the expanded notions of the
"standing" of conservation groups to seek redress of grievances
before administrative agencies,5 could provide a powerful weapon
for those groups to utilize in their fight to save the environment.
53. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150

(1970); Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).

